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chapter 12
Toward a New Conception of Socially-Just Peace
Joshua M. Hall
 Introduction
In this chapter, I approach the subject of peace by way of Andrew Fiala’s pio-
neering, synthetic work on “practical pacifism.” One of Fiala’s articles on the 
subject of peace is entitled “Radical Forgiveness and Human Justice”—and if 
one were to replace “Radical Forgiveness” with “Peace,” this would be a fair 
title for my chapter. In fact, Fiala himself explicitly makes a connection in the 
article between radical forgiveness and peace.1 Also in support of my proj-
ect, Fiala’s article names four of the six historical figures who are central to 
my chapter, namely Marcus Aurelius, King, Arendt, and Nietzsche. Moreover, 
Fiala also insists there “forgiveness must be held in creative tension with jus-
tice,” and it is this very tension that forms the basis of my new conception of 
 socially-just peace. To wit, I propose that socially-just peace is lovingly gener-
ous  reimagining (peace) through intuitively self-overcoming tension (social 
justice).
To elaborate, peace is the result of imagining things to be different from our 
usual ways of seeing them, which requires a kind of generosity, which in turn 
requires a loving comportment. And social justice is the result of tapping into 
an intuitive knowledge, in order to catalyze a process of self-overcoming on 
the part of the oppressed, which self-overcoming allows them to channel the 
tensions produced by oppression into the fight against that oppression. Put 
briefly, socially just peace is sustainable tranquility (peace) through  organismic 
empowerment (social justice). As will be clearer in my discussion of Marcus 
Aurelius below, by “tranquility” here I mean the Stoic sense of a calm, peaceful 
contentment. And by “sustainable,” I intend the sense in contemporary eco-
logical ethics, one crucial feature of which is the ability to prolong a given way 
of life indefinitely into the future.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, I will briefly summarize my 
conception of socially-just peace. Second, to elaborate and support this new 
1 Andrew Fiala, “Radical Forgiveness and Human Justice,” Heythrop Journal: A Bimonthly 
Review of Philosophy and Theology 53:3 (2012): 494–506, accessed August 31, 2016, doi: 
10.1111/j.1468-2265.2010.00637.x.
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conception, I will offer etymological analyses of “peace” and “social justice.” 
Third, I will sketch three historical conceptions germane to both terms (from 
Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., Marcus Aurelius, and Hannah Arendt, and from 
Benedict Spinoza, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Frantz Fanon). And finally, I will 
conclude with an application of this new conception to contemporary debates 
regarding feminism.
In recognition of the aforementioned tension that Fiala notes between 
peace and forgiveness (and that I am claiming applies also to peace and social 
justice), each of these four phases of my analysis will reframe this tension as 
a dialectical challenge—namely, by attempting to resolve the dialectical chal-
lenge of the preceding stage.2 Regarding the first phase of my analysis, which 
involves a conceptual analysis, I describe peace as “sustainable tranquility” and 
social justice as “organismic empowerment.” The dialectical challenge here 
becomes how to empower all organisms (social justice) without permanently 
disturbing the tranquility of the environment (peace). Put simply, how can we 
increase individuals’ ability to overcome social injustice without making them 
more dangerous both to themselves and (nonthreatening) others?
Regarding the second phase of my analysis, its etymological analysis resolves 
this first dialectical tension (from the conceptual analysis), only to introduce 
a new dialectical tension, by revealing peace to be an imaginative fabrication 
of those armed for violence. Put as a question, how can we motivate individu-
als with an actual capacity for violence to engage in the collective production 
of a potential imaginative artwork of peace? Or, more simply, if violence is 
 immediate and real, while peace is futural and imaginary, how can people be 
persuaded to abandon present certainty for future possibility?
Regarding the third phase, its historical analysis resolves this second 
( etymological) dialectical tension by revealing that (a) love can be polemi-
cal, (b) generosity flows from viewing oneself as divine, and (c) reimagining 
 violent others requires imaging them as themselves insufficiently imaginative/
thoughtless. And yet this too introduces a new dialectical tension. To wit, how 
can we tap into these hidden dimensions of love, generosity, and reimaging, 
and render these complex conceptions of them accessible to an audience large 
enough to actually bring about peace?
2 By “dialectical” here, I mean the philosophical method introduced by Plato and most fully 
 developed in Hegel and his successors. For the reader unfamiliar with it, in a dialectical meth-
od, one interlocutor posits a position, which a second interlocutor attempts to  challenge and 
undermine, in response to which challenge the first interlocutor (or a third) modifies the 
initial position (typically in the direction of greater subtlety and sophistication).
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And regarding the final phase, I will suggest that the resolution of this last 
dialectical tension is a concrete example of how a controversial public de-
bate might be reframed by my new conception of peace. More specifically, on 
the subject of contemporary feminism, I will follow Alison Jaggar in calling 
for a lovingly generous reimagining of the battlefield over gendered justice, 
specifically by construing that field as containing—not only feminists and 
anti- feminists—but also what Jaggar terms “non-feminists.”3 It is the individu-
als constituting the latter group, who (per her definition) have not explicitly 
 rejected feminism but who have not yet endorsed it either, whom we could 
most  beneficially reimagine—as insufficiently imaginative or thoughtful 
to have understood the discrimination women continue to face in our glob-
al  society. Insofar as this reimagining is valid, we would perhaps do well to 
 direct a larger percentage of our pedagogical and socializing energies on this 
 non-feminist group. As a result, we might be able to persuade them to join the 
feminist cause, thereby tipping the scales of social justice further to the good.
 Conceptual Analyses of Peace and Social Justice
My new conceptions of peace and social justice draw on the discourses of 
biology and ecology. Beginning with peace, as “sustainable tranquility,” it in-
volves an understanding of peace as restfulness—in the etymological sense of 
 being “filled with rest.” Here, one could link peace to John Dewey’s concept of 
“undergoing.”4 Central to this concept is the idea that animals are constantly 
active, even when they appear motionless, and that even something as ap-
parently passive as sense-perception involves organismic activity. Translated 
into the human realm in general, we must actively choose to engage in activi-
ties that appear passive, including listening, waiting, sleeping, etc. Applied to 
the arena of peace in particular, this means that we must allow ourselves to 
 undergo peace, which includes allowing other things and people to provoke us, 
and to stimulate the expansion of our imaginations.
By contrast, social justice as “organismic empowerment” could be linked 
to Dewey’s complementary (to “undergoing”) concept of “doing.” In this way, 
social justice becomes something that we have to go out and actively pursue, 
instead of merely hoping that it will arrive one day on its own, or assuming 
3 See, for example, Allison Jaggar, “Feminist Ethics: Projects, Problems, Prospects,” in Feminist 
Ethics, ed. Claudi Card (Lawrence, ks: University Press of Kansas, 1991), 78–106.
4 See, for example, John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin, 2005), 23.
0003388449.INDD   250 12/18/2017   12:44:43 PM
251Toward a New Conception of Socially-Just Peace
300845
thoughtlessly that we already have enough of it (or as much of it as one can 
hope for in a “fallen” world, etc.). As “organismic empowerment,” social jus-
tice involves a sense of flourishing, in the etymological sense of an outward- 
spreading display, such as the feathers of a peacock, the panels of a Spanish 
fan, or the limbs of a trained dancer. (This inclusion of nonhuman examples 
is meant to recall that a flourishing world includes diversity, plurality, and het-
erogeneity, including of species). Put differently, social justice is a bottom-up, 
grassroots activity in which each organism is enabled to be its best self. This 
conception is not, therefore, a top-down, centralized imposition of justice re-
lations from above. Nor is social justice, on this account, a reductive affair in 
which one merely subtracts (as it were) “units” of injustice, as identified per-
haps by some governing body or institution.
Seen in this comparative light, and continuing to draw on Dewey’s thought, 
peace becomes a matter of the environment (or community), whereas social 
justice is more concerned with the organism (or individual) in that environ-
ment. In other words, peace is like a web, which requires multiple lines of 
 connection in order to exist at all (since just one or two strands are insuffi-
cient to make a web). Social justice, however, amounts to nothing if it is merely 
connections and abstractions, and must instead be grounded in acts of social 
 justice performed for each individual in a population.
This position is counterintuitive, in the Western tradition at least, where 
peace is often understood (in part due to the influence of Jewish and Christian 
theology) as first and foremost a state of mind or soul in the individual, where-
as justice (at least since Plato’s Republic) is often considered the paradigmatic 
sociopolitical virtue. It is precisely these more traditional conceptions of peace 
and justice, however, that have produced the thus-far irresolvable tensions 
between peace and social justice. That is, we Westerners tend to try to create 
peace individually and internally, and then become frustrated at our inability 
to expand internal peace into peaceful relationships with others. Complemen-
tarily, we devise schemes of abstract justice which have certain beauties qua 
images but which remain insubstantial when we attempt to tether them to the 
individuals who are actually suffering injustice.
The dialectical challenge of my new conceptions, though, involves how 
to facilitate and support organisms’ constant creative exertion toward social 
justice, without those organisms’ environments completely succumbing to 
exhaustion and/or frenzy. Put dramatically, if everyone starts seeking justice 
individually, and tries to coordinate peace among all the other justice-seekers, 
then it looks a bit like a typical superhero story line, in which a large number 
of exceptionally powerful individuals rip the world apart while trying to save 
it from one another.
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 Etymological Analyses of Peace and Social Justice
To resolve the aforementioned tension, it is necessary to explore the etymolo-
gies of the two central phrases being deployed in this discourse. For both et-
ymologies, I draw on the discourses of myth and religion in that it is found 
in Jesus of Nazareth’s conception of peace.5 “Peacemaking” is based on a 
compound Ancient Greek word—eirene- + poiesis—which betrays a connec-
tion to the analyses of poetry as theatrical creation in Plato (through which 
 connection the disciplined activity of peace could be understood as a kind of 
theatrical artwork).6 In other words, peace is not only social (as the conceptual 
analysis already revealed) but artificial and fabricated as well. In contrast to 
this, social justice takes the form of Dike, the sword-bearing Greek goddess of 
human justice (or Dike’s Roman counterpart, Iustus, with her famous blind-
fold, scales, and sword). In other words, social justice is not only individual 
(as the conceptual analysis already revealed) but also natural and real.
What follows from these new etymological understandings is that (a) peace 
will no more exist on its own than a novel or symphony that has never been 
imaginatively composed; and (b) social justice is so natural and actual that its 
denial will ultimately lead to violence, which entails that it requires something 
like self-restraint in regard to one’s capacity for force (rather than as  direct as-
sertion of that capacity). These etymologies thus resolve the dialectical ten-
sion I identified in my conceptual analyses, namely by identifying the sources 
of that tension as (a) the artificiality/fabricated-ness of peace, and (b) the 
 necessity of the discipline of self-restraint within effective fighters for social 
justice. Put differently, we must stop waiting for a peace that will never  arrive 
by  nature, and we must attempt to keep sheathed the swords with which social 
justice empowers us. This, however, begs the question as to how this  fabrication 
and self-discipline can be attained, which constitutes the next dialectical chal-
lenge, and which requires a reinvestigation of alternative conceptions from the 
history of philosophy germane to peace and social justice.
 Historical Analyses Germane to Peace and Social Justice
To resolve the aforementioned tension—as to how we can imaginatively 
compose peace (as sustainable tranquility) among the just (as empowered 
5 See Matthew 5:9.
6 See for example, Ion, in Plato: Statesman, Philebus, Ion (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University 
Press, 1925).
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 organisms), who necessarily have the capacity for divisive harm—it is neces-
sary to explore our history, to which the majority of the present chapter will 
be devoted. More specifically, I will consider three marginalized historical 
 conceptions germane to peace, and three such conceptions germane to social 
justice. To foreshadow my analyses below, everything turns on the role of il-
lusion, imagination, and even deception, and the common thread in the six 
thinkers is an emphasis on metaphors drawn from dance and poetry (as script 
and performance) in the theatrical arts.
To clarify, what follows below are not all, or at least not necessarily, concep-
tions of peace and social justice, but rather conceptions that are useful for and/
or illuminating of peace and social justice. Thus, I am not claiming that the 
first three theorists are “peace theorists” (or peace advocates) per se, nor that 
the latter three theorists are “social justice theorists.” But that does not mean 
that the six thinkers do not offer insights potentially invaluable for those who 
do endorse these two causes. By implication, moreover, both clusters of theo-
rists do not necessarily have much in common, because it is not necessary for 
two theorists who illuminate the same concept (like King and Aurelius regard-
ing peace) to share a similar worldview. The synthesis of the six occurs, instead, 
in my own hybrid concepts of peace and social justice.
For peace, I will draw on the anthology of King’s writings entitled A Tes-
tament of Hope, on Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations, and on Hannah Arendt’s 
 Eichmann in Jerusalem.7 Their respective conceptions of peace are as follows: 
(a) agape love torsioned away from god and toward the community (from 
King), in order to fund (b) divinely tolerant generosity toward others (from 
 Aurelius), in the form of (c) imagining evil as merely banal and thus the others 
as forgivable (from Arendt). Put in terms of peace as “lovingly generous rei-
magining,” King offers love, Aurelius generosity, and Arendt reimagining.
As for social justice, I will draw on Spinoza’s Ethics, Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, and Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth.8 Their respective conceptions 
of social justice are as follows: (d) an intuitive maximization of one’s being 
as a mode (or stylization) of the cosmos (Spinoza), (e) which  maximization 
7 Martin Luther King Jr., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin 
 Luther King Jr., ed. James M. Washington (New York: HarperOne, 2003); Marcus Aurelius, 
Meditations, trans. Martin Hammond (New York: Penguin, 2006); and Hannah Arendt, 
 Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 2006a).
8 Baruch Spinoza, Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. and trans. G.H.R. Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000); Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, ed. Adrian Del Caro and Robert 
Pippen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of 
the Earth, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove, 2005).
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erupts in a self-transformation (Nietzsche), that (f) converts the literal 
 muscular tension of oppressed communities into liberating art (Fanon). In 
one word each, Spinoza offers perseverance, Nietzsche offers self-overcoming, 
and Fanon tension, to form my hybrid conception of social justice as “intui-
tively  self-overcoming tension.” I will now offer more detailed analyses of all 
six texts.
 King on “Lovingly”
I begin with King, whose conception of agape constitutes the “lovingly” ad-
verb in “lovingly generous reimagining.” Here I will utilize King’s article, en-
titled “An Experiment in Love.” (excerpted from King’s Stride toward Freedom: 
The  Montgomery Circle, originally appearing in the September 1958 edition 
of the magazine Jubilee) Despite significant overlap with many other texts by 
King, this article is distinguished by a more extended reflection on love, and 
 contains three primary insights relevant to my presentation. The first insight is 
that King describes the concept of love, which he traces to Jesus of Nazareth, 
in the following surprising terms: namely, as “the creative weapon of love.”9 
Two things here are worthy of note. To begin with, love is  traditionally under-
stood as the opposite of violence (like the opposing principles of eros versus 
polemos [strife] in Empedocles’s metaphysics), and thus contrary to weap-
ons per se. Also, weapons are traditionally understood as destructive, rather 
than creative. Perhaps this is a subtle allusion in King (among many others) 
to  Nietzsche, in this case to the Gay Science’s famous claim that “only as cre-
ators can we destroy.”10 Thus, love for King means reimagining (like Arendt) 
certain things to be their apparent opposites. This connection to reimagining, 
moreover, helps clarify the precise nature of love’s creation for King. To wit, 
it is theatrical creation, which is also true of Aurelius’s concept of generosity, 
and Arendt’s concept of reimagining. Finally, on this point, the stated purpose 
of King’s theatrical creation (as he repeats in other writings, including the 
article “Nonviolence: The Only Road to Freedom”) is to dramatize real-world 
 injustices, specifically for audiences who were (a) committing violence against 
the nonviolent protestors, or (b) reading and viewing media coverage of said 
 injustices and violence.11
The second insight relevant to my investigation in “An Experiment in Love” 
concerns a quote that King takes from Gandhi, regarding the fighter for civil 
rights entering jail “as a bridegroom enters the bride’s chamber.” Here again 
9 King, Hope, 16.
10 King, Hope, 58.
11 King, Hope, 58.
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(as with his weapon metaphor) King invokes the metaphor of love ( specifically 
the eros of marital consummation) to describe another phenomenon  generally 
 regarded as antithetical to love (in the present case, prison). More precisely, 
this antithetical relationship between prison and love (like that between 
weapons and love) also involves violence.
In both of these metaphors (weaponry and imprisonment) then, King pro-
vokes us to reconceive love itself as a kind of active, forceful, even aggressive 
power vis-à-vis some object. I use the word “object” here deliberately—as 
 opposed to the more obvious choice of “opponent” or “enemy”—because King 
repeatedly insists (here and elsewhere in his writings) that “the attack” in his 
nonviolent method of civil disobedience “is directed against forces of evil rath-
er than against persons who happen to be doing the evil.”12 This means, finally 
from King, that his concept of love is also generous (including in the etymo-
logical sense in which generosity “generates” the next generation, consequent 
upon the bridegroom’s entry into the bride’s chamber). In short, love is not a 
passive feeling, but rather an active giving. On this note, I turn to Aurelius’s 
peace-facilitating emphasis on generosity.
 Aurelius on “Generous”
Aurelius, to repeat, contributes the “generous” adjective to “lovingly  generous 
reimagining.” As I explore in detail elsewhere, Aurelius’s treatment of the the-
atrical art of dance in his Meditations reveals a political ethics constituted 
by (a) an ethics of patient tolerance, and (b) the generosity flowing from the 
 micro-political power created by cultivating one’s inner divinity.13 In brief, 
 beginning with the ethical partner in this “dance” of political ethics, the word 
“tolerance” (according to the oed) comes from the Latin tolerare, meaning “to 
bear, endure,” and the word “patience” derives from the Latin patior, mean-
ing “to suffer.” As for the dance’s political partner, “generosity” derives from 
the Latin generosus, meaning “of noble birth, noble-spirited, of good stock or 
breeding (of animals or plants), superior.” It is on the latter that I will focus 
here, with a brief consideration of Aurelius’s references to “generosity” in the 
Meditations.
To begin, in the first section of the text, which amounts to a catalogue of 
thanksgiving to his teachers and other loved ones, Aurelius praises the following 
three different people for their generosity: (a) his mother, for her “ generosity” 
12 King, Hope, 18.
13 See Joshua M. Hall, “A Divinely Tolerant Political Ethics: Dancing with Aurelius,” Epoché: 
A Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (2): 2016, 327–348.
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per se; (b) a fellow philosopher-politician, for his “unstinting generosity”; and 
(c) the Stoic senator Claudius Maximus, for his “generosity in good works.”14 
To connect these remarks to my previous subsection, the reference to Aure-
lius’s mother reinforces the connection between generosity and love as noted 
by King (given the traditional association between maternity and love).
In Aurelius’s second reference in the text to generosity, he writes that there 
is something “agreeable” in “generosity” itself. One could perhaps interpolate 
here the synonym for agreeable, “lovable.”15 Third, Aurelius argues that his 
possession of reason entails that he should treat “dumb animals and gener-
ally all things and objects with generosity.”16 This expanded notion of generos-
ity clearly involves both a loving attitude (as in King), and also a significant 
reimagining (as in Arendt) of every single thing in the cosmos as an appropri-
ate object of said generosity. Fourth, Aurelius describes his own “character” 
as “generous.”17 Finally, Aurelius advises himself to be “generous with” him-
self, parsed as the following imperative: “leave all the past behind, entrust the 
 future to providence, and direct the present solely to reverence and justice.”18 
I will now attempt to condense these points, and Aurelius’s political ethics of 
patient tolerance and divine generosity, into a scenario involving Aurelius’s 
privileged metaphor of humans as puppets.
Imagine, if you will, finding yourself on a theatrical stage, as a life-size pup-
pet, from which long strings rise up into the rafters above you. Then imagine 
that, on this same stage, there are a number of other life-size puppets, whose 
sole important difference from you is that their strings are all being controlled 
by one indifferent puppeteer. Your strings, by contrast, are wrapped around a 
beam above the stage and dropped back down and attached to the top of your 
head, such that, by moving your head in complex ways, you control the move-
ments of the rest of your body. Finally, imagine that the puppeteer of the other 
puppets always keeps some music playing, and continuously makes the other 
puppets dance to it.
There you are, suspended from the artificial heavens, bound by strings to 
a stage that is your only possible home, and all the other puppets are danc-
ing. What, then, should you do? Before you answer, keep in mind that you are 
armed with the following two vital truths: (1) you are in the minority of puppets 
14 Aurelius, Meditations, Book i: paragraphs 3, 14, and 15.
15 Aurelius, Meditations, Book v: paragraph 10.
16 Aurelius, Meditations, Book vi: paragraph 5.
17 Aurelius, Meditations, Book 10: paragraph 36.
18 Aurelius, Meditations, Book 12: paragraph 1.
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with the godlike power to move yourself, and (2) the non-self-moving puppets 
are essentially the same as you, except that they are powerless to resist the 
 movements of the puppeteer. According to Aurelius, the only rational and po-
litically virtuous course of action is to channel your divinely based thoughtful 
power into the generosity necessary to dance with the other puppets—who, 
after all, share your spark of rational divinity—as beautifully as you can. For 
some helpful stage directions regarding this challenging task, I now turn to my 
third and final historical thinker in connection to peace.
 Arendt on “Reimagining”
Hannah Arendt, to repeat, contributes the “reimagining” noun to my concep-
tion of peace as “lovingly generous reimagining.” I will approach this concept of 
reimagining primarily indirectly, through Arendt’s reflections on thoughtless-
ness, as thoughtlessness is arguably the phenomenon that results from a lack 
of reimagining. The primary example of such thoughtlessness in her oeuvre is 
Adolf Eichmann, whom she treats—with a surprising degree of humor—as 
a comical figure. Arendt describes the “horrible” phenomenon of Eichmann’s 
thoughtlessness as “outright funny.”19 For example, she writes that “officialese,” 
as she terms it, “became his language because he was genuinely incapable of 
uttering a single sentence that was not a cliché.”20 As such, Eichmann’s role as 
an actor in the theater of his trial, according to Arendt, is “not a ‘monster,’” but 
rather “a clown.”21
As for the reason for this clownishness, Arendt concludes that Eichmann 
was—shockingly—too completely “normal,” specifically in a horrific Nazi 
context in which “only ‘exceptions’ could be expected to act ‘normally.’”22 
Zeroing in further on the problem, Arendt observes that Eichmann showed 
an “ inability to ever look at things from the other fellow’s point of view.”23 In 
short, Eichmann dramatizes for Arendt the horrendous potential of the clown-
ish thoughtlessness of the average modern person. As the aforementioned ref-
erence to “comedy” already hints (and as I noted above in my discussions of 
King’s theatrical art of civil disobedience, and of Aurelius’s dance of tolerant 
generosity), the theatrical is equally central for Arendt. In fact, she even goes 
so far (in her essay, “What Is Freedom?”) to compare political speech to a dance 
19 Arendt, Eichmann, 48.
20 Arendt, Eichmann, 48.
21 Arendt, Eichmann, 54.
22 Arendt, Eichmann, 27.
23 Arendt, Eichmann, 48.
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performance, while Eichmann in Jerusalem describes his trial as a theatrical 
performance in its opening pages.24
The opposite of such thoughtlessness, as Arendt writes in her Lectures on 
Kant’s Political Philosophy, is a maximally “enlarged mentality.”25 Such a men-
tality, Arendt explains, “by the force of the imagination makes the others 
present.”26 By this, Arendt means that reimagining incorporates, when forming 
a political judgment, indefinitely many other peoples’ perspectives. Her anal-
ogy for this incorporation is the ideal theatrical spectator, who incorporates 
various figurative angles on a given performance in order to judge its merits.27 
To return to Eichmann in Jerusalem, Arendt there offers, as a contrast case to 
Eichmann, the thoughtless clown, the equally theatrical heroism of the people 
of Denmark.
Facilitated by their thoughtful imagination of their Jewish “others” as fully 
human, and (Arendt notes) “unique among the countries of Europe,” the Dan-
ish people openly defied the Nazis’ attempts to forcibly evacuate the Jewish 
people from Denmark.28 The story of how they did so, Arendt claims, should 
be “required reading in political science for all students who wish to learn 
something about the power inherent in nonviolent action and in resistance 
to an opponent possessing vastly superior means of violence.”29 The outline of 
this story is as follows. First, Arendt notes that “only the Danes dared speak out 
on the subject [of “the Jewish question”] to their German masters,” whereas 
all the other European nations held their tongues, and resisted (if at all) in se-
cret.30 Second, when the Nazis proposed the infamous yellow badge be used to 
identify Jewish people, the Nazis “were simply told that the King would be the 
first to wear it.”31 Third, the Danes argued that, “because the stateless refugees 
[non-Danish Jewish people] were no longer German citizens, the Nazis could 
not claim them without Danish consent.”32 Fourth, as a consequence—and 
one that Arendt describes as “truly amazing”—“everything went topsy-turvy.”33 
24 Hannah Arendt, “What Is Freedom?” Between Past and Future (New York: Penguin, 2006b), 
152; and Arendt, Eichmann, 4.
25 Hannah Arendt, Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner (Chicago: 
 University of Chicago Press, 1989), 44.
26 Arendt, Kant, 55.
27 Arendt, Kant, 55.
28 Arendt, Eichmann, 171.
29 Arendt, Eichmann, 171.
30 Arendt, Eichmann, 171.
31 Arendt, Eichmann, 171.
32 Arendt, Eichmann, 172.
33 Arendt, Eichmann, 172.
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For example, “riots broke out in Danish shipyards, where the dock workers re-
fused to repair German ships and then went on strike.”34 Fifth, when the Nazis 
came to kidnap the Jewish people and begin their deportation from Denmark 
( ultimately intended for the concentration camps), the Danish police allowed 
the Nazis to take only those Jewish people who were “at home and willing to let 
them in”—which figure ended up being merely 477 of the 7,800 Jewish people 
there.35 Sixth, the Jewish authorities in Denmark publicized the impending 
kidnappings openly in the synagogues, giving the people “just enough time 
to leave their apartments and go into hiding” among a Danish community in 
which every citizen welcomed them.36 Finally, in regard to the last phase of 
Denmark’s response, the secret evacuation of the hidden Jewish people to 
safety in Sweden, the extensive cost of this evacuation, Arendt notes, “was paid 
largely by wealthy Danish citizens.”37
Even more surprising to Arendt than the actions of the Danish is the fact 
that their imaginative thoughtfulness proved contagious, in that “the Ger-
man officials who had been living in [Denmark] for years were no longer the 
same” as they had been back in Germany.38 In fact, Arendt elaborates, even 
“the  special s.s. units employed in Denmark frequently objected to ‘the mea-
sures they were ordered to carry out by the central agencies.’”39 In conclusion, 
Denmark was “the only case we know of in which the Nazis met with open 
native resistance,” and “the result seems to have been that those exposed to it 
changed their minds.”40 In other words, the Danish citizens imagined them-
selves in the Jewish people’s place, and then acted politically on the basis of 
this reimagining, which managed to inspire even some of the Nazis, also, to 
reimagine the Jewish people as fully human.
Having thus considered all three thinkers on the dancingly theatrical art-
work of peace, I now turn to my final three thinkers in order to explore the 
poetic discipline of social justice.
 Spinoza on “Intuitively”
My first thinker germane to social justice, Spinoza, contributes the “ intuitively” 
adverb to my conception of social justice as “intuitively  self-overcoming 
34 Arendt, Eichmann, 172.
35 Arendt, Eichmann, 173.
36 Arendt, Eichmann, 173, 174.
37 Arendt, Eichmann, 174.
38 Arendt, Eichmann, 172.
39 Arendt, Eichmann, 173.
40 Arendt, Eichmann, 175.
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 tension.” It is imperative, at the outset, to note that Spinoza introduces a 
unique, technical definition of “intuition.” To clarify that definition, I will pref-
ace my discussion of it with a brief overview of Spinoza’s thought regarding 
knowledge in general. As I explore in detail elsewhere, for Spinoza, the first 
kind of knowledge, which he calls “imagination,” is a kind of sense-experience 
of particulars.41 The second kind of knowledge, which he calls “understand-
ing,” involves the rational grasp of universals. And the third kind of knowledge, 
in Spinoza’s words, “proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence 
of some of the attributes of god to an adequate knowledge of the essence of 
things.”42 I will now unpack this difficult quote word by word, and then argue 
that the medium of poetry constitutes a privileged locus for Spinoza’s intu-
ition. More specifically, I will focus on the subgenre of poetry that is theatrical 
dramatic poetry, drawing on Hasana Sharp’s feminist analysis of Spinoza on 
embodiment.43
To begin, an “idea” for Spinoza denotes, not a mental representation or the 
content of such a representation, but rather “an action of the mind … involving 
judgment.”44 By an “adequate idea,” in turn, Spinoza means “an idea which, in-
sofar as it is considered in itself without relation to its object, has all the proper-
ties, or the extrinsic denominations, of a true idea.”45 Adequacy, then, could be 
paraphrased as truth minus correspondence, or truth that remains at the level 
of generality, and without any relation to a concrete object.  Regarding the sec-
ond concept in Spinoza’s definition of intuition, namely essence, he describes 
a being’s essence as that which is distinctive of that type of being, which es-
sence thereby defines said type of being. Spinoza defines the “actual essence” 
41 Joshua M. Hall, “Poetic Intuition: Spinoza and Gerard Manley Hopkins,” Philosophy Today 
57:4 (2013): 401–407.
42 Spinoza, Ethics, 149. I will follow the system of citation used by Parkinson in his edition:
“a = Axiom
c = Corollary
d = Definition
de = Definition of the Emotions (Part 3)
l = Lemma
p = Proposition
s = Scholium
(So, for example, ‘e2p40s2’ refers to Ethics, Part 2, Proposition 40, Scholium 2)”.
43 Hasana Sharp, Spinoza and the Politics of Renaturalization (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press), 2011.
44 Gilles Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, trans. Robert Hurley (San Francisco: City 
Lights, 1988), 52.
45 Spinoza, Ethics, e2d4.
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of a thing (i.e., a thing’s essence as we conceive it) as “the endeavor to perse-
vere in its own being,” condensed in the word conatus.46 And the “formal” of 
“formal essence” in Spinoza’s above definition equates, in  contemporary terms, 
to “reality.” Finally from the first half of the above quote, the third concept in 
Spinoza’s definition of intuition, “attribute,” he defines elsewhere in the Ethics 
as “that which intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence.”47 
Since (a) “substance” and “God” are synonymous terms for  Spinoza, and (b) 
human beings can perceive only two of substance/god’s infinite  attributes 
(namely, thought and extension), the referent in the above quote of “some of 
the attributes of God” can only be “thought” and “extension.” To paraphrase the 
first half of Spinoza’s definition of intuition, substituting my elaborations for 
the original terms: intuition is a faculty of knowing that makes an inference or 
judgment on the basis of an internally consistent, general, and real truth about 
thought per se or extension per se.
Onward, then, to the second half of Spinoza’s definition of intuition. To 
 recall, it proceeds from “an adequate idea of the formal essence of some of the 
attributes of God …” and to “an adequate knowledge of the essence of things.” 
I have observed that adequate knowledge means the same thing as true knowl-
edge, but without reference to the existing entity that is known. And I have 
noted that the essence of a thing for Spinoza is its conatus, its endeavor to 
persist in its being. As for the last phrase, “things” for Spinoza are what he 
terms “finite modes.”48 “Modes” in general for Spinoza are what he terms 
“ affections of substance, or, that which is in something else, through which it 
is also conceived.”49 These modes are modifications of substance by way of be-
ing modifications of the attributes of substance (which for human knowledge 
are limited to thought and extension). And “finite modes”—that is, particular 
things—he describes as “nothing other than the affections, i.e., the modes, of 
the attributes of God, by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain 
and determinate way.”50 For example, the attribute of extension is one way in 
which the intellect perceives the essence of substance, and a particular human 
body is simply one (finite) mode of extension. To paraphrase the second half of 
Spinoza’s definition of intuition, substituting my elaborations for the original 
46 Spinoza, Ethics, e3p7.
47 Spinoza, Ethics, e1d4.
48 G.H.R. Parkinson, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Spinoza’s Ethics, ed. and trans. G.H.R. 
 Parkinson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 21.
49 Spinoza, Ethics, e1d5.
50 Spinoza, Ethics, e1p25c.
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terms: intuition is a faculty of knowing that infers an internally consistent and 
general truth about the conatus of things.
Condensing the above analyses of both halves of Spinoza’s definition, in in-
tuition one arrives at a rationally correct conception of the conatus of a thing 
(i.e., a finite mode) by means of a rationally correct conception of thought or 
extension. Put differently, if one really understands thought and/or extension 
in principle, one can thereby infer the essence of a particular thing. Thus, if 
one understands that thought and extension are the intellect’s perception of 
the essence of god/substance, then one can understand that particular things 
are conceived by human beings in terms of or by means of thought and exten-
sion. One must know what extension is in order to understand a particular 
extended thing, and one must know what thought is to understand a particular 
mental thing.
I will now attempt to flesh out the broader context in which Spinoza de-
ploys this concept of intuition. Spinoza claims that intuition, like understand-
ing, “is necessarily true” and “teaches us to distinguish between the true and 
the false.”51 He compares intuition to the intuitive grasp of a mathematical 
formula, which is achieved by considering the relationship among specific 
numbers plugged into the formula (as opposed to an understanding achieved 
by calculating the problem using variables). Spinoza also provides a few other 
scattered clues for understanding his concept of intuition. He describes it as 
being especially powerful in overcoming the negative effects of the emotions, 
and as inspiring the intellectual love of God as eternal and infinite.52 Further, 
he claims that to “understand things by the third kind of knowledge” is the 
“highest endeavor of the mind, and its highest virtue,” because “the more we 
understand things in this way [in their essence, i.e., reality] the more … we un-
derstand God.”53 Spinoza describes this understanding as the mind’s “power” 
and “virtue” and “nature” (all of which, for him, are synonymous). Addition-
ally, the more things the mind grasps in this way, the more it wants to grasp 
things in this way. In such pursuits, Spinoza claims, the mind finds its greatest 
peace.54 Finally in terms of these clues, it is also worth noting that Spinoza 
regards the mind itself (rather than, say, external things, or god), as the cause 
of the third kind of knowledge.55
51 Spinoza, Ethics, e2p41.
52 Spinoza, Ethics, e5p20s.
53 Spinoza, Ethics, e5p25, e5p25d.
54 Spinoza, Ethics, e5p26–27.
55 Spinoza, Ethics, e5p31d.
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In light of these observations, one possible understanding of intuition is 
that it consists in a combination of the specificity and concreteness of the first 
kind of knowledge (“imagination”) with the accuracy and generality of the sec-
ond kind of knowledge (“understanding”). In other words, through intuition, 
the universal and the particular are understood through each other. Either 
thought or extension is grasped through the action of a specific idea. Conversely, 
a specific idea is enacted by grasping the nature of thought or  extension in 
itself. Above all, it seems central for intuition that the relationship between 
generality and specificity is affirmed. And nothing, arguably, is more effective 
at affirming the generality-specificity relationship than language.
On the one hand, via its connection to thinking, language is a property 
or  dimension of thought. On the other hand, via its connection to speech, 
language is also a property or dimension of extension. Language is thus dis-
tinctly capable of affirming, at an intuitive level, Spinoza’s central claim that 
thought and extension are merely two different ways of representing the same 
substance. Furthermore, whenever language is used to denote particulars, it 
brings its nature as a universal medium to bear on those particulars, and thus 
affirms the resonance between generality (that is, rationality) and specificity 
(that is, phenomena in the world).
Moreover, this inherent power of language in general as a vehicle for 
 intuition is even greater in poetry in particular. The reason for this is that 
 poetry both utilizes language to describe particular situations, thoughts, feel-
ings, observations, etc., and also manifests language as language. Especially in 
the subgenre of dramatic poetry, and even more especially when that poetry is 
performed, poetry foregrounds language’s capacities for affirming the general- 
specific  relationship at the same time as it refers to the phenomena in the 
world named by the language of the poem.
More precisely, in thinking about poetry, whether reading silently or hear-
ing the actors speaking their poetic lines during a play, one is made aware not 
only of what the poem is describing about the world but also of the activity 
of the attribute of thought, or of thought taking place. Similarly, in scanning 
poetry with one’s eyes, one is aware not only of how the words match up with 
things in the world but also of how language itself is an extended thing made 
of ink, a physical spread of words on a page. Finally on this note, when one 
hears poetry performed, one is made aware not only of the things in the world 
that the sounds evoke but also of language as itself a physically extended phe-
nomenon, namely sound waves spun from vibrating vocal cords and inhabit-
ing the surrounding air.
To bring this discussion of poetry and intuition back to social justice, in-
tuition is the power that enables us to know each being, including ourselves, 
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in those beings’ relationship to every other being, and to the cosmic whole. 
Intuition thus shows us that we are all equal insofar as we are all modalities 
of the cosmos, as thinking and extended things. And dramatically performed 
poetry in particular has an enormous power to increase and reinforce this 
 knowledge, by making vivid our metaphysical solidarity will all fellow beings 
(as for  example with the Founding Fathers’ favorite play, Cato).56 In this way, 
poetry can inspire those engaged in the struggle for social justice, by uniting 
protestors, in voice and mind, in the common cause.
 Nietzsche on “Self-Overcoming”
My second thinker illuminative of social justice, Nietzsche, offers the “self-
overcoming” adjective to my conception of social justice as “intuitively 
 self-overcoming tension.” To repeat, I am not claiming that Nietzsche was an 
 advocate of social justice. Although one could conceivably make the case that 
he is an advocate for a kind of hierarchized social justice—an unequal treat-
ment appropriate to unequal beings—I will save this analysis for a  separate 
inquiry. My discussion of this concept of self-overcoming will be briefer 
than those for the other five thinkers, on the assumption that most readers 
will  already be familiar with the concept (given its central importance in 
 Nietzsche’s oeuvre).
The fullest exposition of self-overcoming is found in the section bearing that 
title in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In addition to the obvious connection between 
this text and poetry—namely, the fact that Thus Spoke Zarathustra belongs in 
the genre of prose poetry—there is also a significant connection between its 
section “On Self-Overcoming” and dance, insofar as the latter section appears 
just pages after another section entitled “The Dance Song.” In this dancing sec-
tion, Nietzsche depicts Zarathustra as briefly joyful and reconciled to life as a 
result of watching the dance of a group of beautiful young women. Then, in the 
subsequent section, entitled “The Grave Song” (which immediately precedes 
the “On Self-Overcoming” section), Zarathustra expresses the melancholy that 
ensues when the dance ends. “Only in dance,” Nietzsche writes, “do I know 
how to speak the parables of the highest things—and now my highest parable 
remained unspoken in my limbs!”57 What survives this melancholy, however, 
is Zarathustra’s “will,” which “wants to walk its course on my feet,” because 
56 Joseph Addison, Cato: A Tragedy, and Selected Essays, ed. Christine Dunn Henderson and 
Mark E. Yellin (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004).
57 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 87.
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“ Invulnerable am I only in the heel.”58 On this note, Nietzsche transitions to 
the section titled “On Self-Overcoming.”
“On Self-Overcoming” begins by claiming that the will to truth is actually 
the will to power in disguise, and then Nietzsche suddenly swerves (or exe-
cutes a dancing spin) to a discussion of Zarathustra’s own truth-search into the 
nature of life itself. From this search, Zarathustra claims to have learned the 
following three things: (1) “All living is an obeying”; (2) “the one who cannot 
obey himself is commanded”; and (3) “commanding is harder than obeying.” 
Zarathustra’s inference from these three things, finally, is that all commanding 
involves “an experiment and a risk.”59 For example, Nietzsche writes, “the liv-
ing” being “must become the judge and avenger and victim of its own law,” and 
in so doing, this living being “risks—life itself.”60
As an apparent reward for having thus boldly experimented with the truth 
of life, a personification of life grants to Zarathustra the privilege of hearing 
life’s secret: “I am,” Life says to Zarathustra, “that which must always overcome 
itself.”61 In order to perform this self-overcoming—and here Nietzsche returns 
to the metaphor of dance/walking—life must walk on “crooked paths.”62 Put 
more concretely, the life within one’s self must oppose even that self ’s own 
creations, along with the love the self feels for its creations. The reason for this 
necessary opposition, according to Nietzsche, is that life values other things 
more highly than life. In particular, life values power. In the service of power, 
Nietzsche concludes the “On Self-Overcoming” section as follows: “And may 
everything break that can possibly be broken by our truths! Many a house has 
yet to be built!”63
To translate these insights into the discourse of social justice, those of us 
who desire it must also desire the increased empowerment of social justice 
even more than we desire the well-being of our own bodies and lives. From 
this perspective, these bodies will soon die, and our lives derive a majority of 
their value from the living force within them (rather than the span of time that 
we are alive as individuals). Our best, in other words, lies in becoming more 
than we are. As a result, we can in good conscience encourage ourselves to 
risk  everything that belongs to us as individuals, in a grand experiment for the 
further empowerment of social justice.
58 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 87.
59 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 89.
60 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 89.
61 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 89.
62 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 89.
63 Nietzsche, Spoke Zarathustra, 90.
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 Fanon on “Tension”
The final historical thinker in this chapter, Frantz Fanon, supplies the “ten-
sion” noun to my conception of social justice as “intuitively self-overcoming 
tension.” In Wretched of the Earth, Fanon describes the embodied oppression 
of black peoples living under antiblack racism, specifically that of the era 
of  European colonialism. Although his analyses therefore originate with a 
 specific set of historical circumstances, those circumstances were sustained by 
ideological structures of racism that have survived, albeit in mutated forms, to 
the present day. From my detailed exploration, elsewhere, of Fanon’s analysis, 
the most relevant portion thereof for the present chapter is his conception of 
“perpetual muscular tension.”64
The first indication of this concept appears early in Wretched of the Earth, 
in Fanon’s claim that “the dreams of the colonized subject are muscular 
dreams.”65 Repressing their rage toward their oppressors, he explains, the op-
pressed experience a buildup of stress in their very bodies, as a result of which 
the “muscles of the colonized are always tensed.”66 Much later, Fanon returns 
to the issue of muscular tension in his description of the colonized intellectual 
who “feels he must escape this white culture” by withdrawing from Western-
ization. The connection to muscular tension is that this movement, according 
to Fanon, “above all calls to mind a muscular reflex, a muscular contraction.” 
For this reason, the colonized intellectual’s style is an “energetic style, alive 
with rhythms, bursting with life,” in preparation for a “swift, painful combat 
where inevitably the muscle had to replace the concept.”67
To connect Fanon’s insights back to the theatrical art of dance, to be a danc-
er is to be in constant muscular ready awareness, storing energy in tension to 
be released in a display of powerful grace or desperate aggression. Such a mus-
cular, physiological awareness is important in the struggle of black persons 
and communities for genuine equality, as a significant marker or litmus test for 
the success of that struggle. In this way, dance could be used to foreground the 
importance of the physical/bodily dimension of being a raced being, as well as 
the importance of ensuring that theoretical insights can also be applied at the 
level of concrete human embodiment.68
64 Joshua M. Hall, “Revalorized Black Embodiment: Dancing with Fanon,” Journal of Black 
Studies 43(3): 2012, 274–288.
65 Fanon, Wretched, 15.
66 Fanon, Wretched, 16.
67 Fanon, Wretched, 80, 84.
68 Given the easy applicability of Fanon’s analyses of black embodiment in antiblack racist 
cultures to the experience of dancers, it is interesting that in the contemporary white 
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Admittedly, Fanon rarely discusses dance explicitly, including two brief 
references in Black Skin, White Masks and two in Wretched of the Earth, and 
in three of these four references the connotations are intensely pejorative. 
 However, the fourth and final such reference (and the second and final refer-
ence in Wretched of the Earth) is unequivocally positive, appearing after Fanon’s 
extensive discussion of what he calls “combat literature.” To wit, he suggests 
that dance can be transformed into a kind of combat dance, much like ordi-
nary literature can become combat literature, which prepares the colonized 
people for political liberation, and contributes to “the new national rhythm” 
that “drives the nation.”69 This transformation of cultural and religious dance 
into combat dance consists, essentially, of integrating contemporary political 
consciousness into dance artworks, creating dances whose rhythms inspire 
proud revolt.
In addition to Fanon’s brief moment of explicit affirmation of dance, one 
can also find dance-resonance in Fanon’s earlier analyses of “perpetual mus-
cular tension.” That is, the phenomenological similarities between dancing 
 embodiment and Fanon’s accounts of black embodiment in racist and colo-
nized societies buttress his hopes for combat dance. More specifically, one 
might be able to channel the constructive and affirmative energy often  directed 
toward dance qua art form into strategies for affirming and improving the lives 
of disempowered persons of color seeking social justice. Put more concretely, 
the beauty of tension as embodied by dancers (qua artistic performers) could 
be imaginatively extended to people of color (qua survivors of racism), for 
 example by encouraging a recognition of tension’s potential benefits for the 
ongoing struggle for social justice.
 Recapitulation
Having thus considered these six texts, figures, and aspects—the historical di-
mension of my conceptions of peace and social justice—one is left with yet 
United States, there is a stereotype that black persons are essentially better dancers than 
white persons. It is also interesting that dancing is generally understood to be the privi-
leged province of other oppressed or disadvantaged groups as well, including women 
and gay men. Women more than men, alternatively oriented more than exclusively het-
erosexual, non-Westerners more than Westerners, rural folk more than urbanites, the 
 conventional more than the unconventional, are perceived as being both interested and 
proficient in dance.
69 Fanon, Wretched, 157.
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another challenge, namely how to love the agents and vehicles of oppression 
qua the not-yet-just. To resolve this final tension requires nothing less than 
real-time political action. Thus, I will close this chapter with a specific sug-
gestion, and an invitation to further public discourse, regarding the fight for 
gendered social justice today. But first, I will briefly rehearse the insights of this 
chapter thus far.
Overall, I have attempted in this chapter to sketch a new conception of 
socially-just peace. At a first, conceptual level, I defined social justice as sus-
tainable tranquility through organismic empowerment. The counterintuitive 
implication of these conceptual analyses is that peace is predominantly exter-
nal and social, whereas social justice is predominantly internal and individual.
At a second, etymological level, I claimed that peace’s sustainable tran-
quility is based on its being an artificial, artful construction (as in the peace 
“made” by Jesus of Nazareth’s “peacemakers”), while social justice’s organis-
mic  empowerment is based on its being the disciplined self-restraint of those 
armed for force (as in the Roman goddess Iustus, who stills her sword until 
her scales have rendered their verdict). The counterintuitive implication of 
these etymological analyses is that peace is unnatural and must be continu-
ously  created, while social justice requires that the oppressed restrain their 
own impulses to use violent force (unless this capacity for force has already 
been denied by their society, as is often the case).
And at a third, historical level, I claimed that (a) peace’s sustainable tran-
quility through artful construction consists of polemical love, to facilitate 
 divine-like generosity, deployed in a thoughtful reimagining of the other; while 
(b) social justice’s organismic empowerment through disciplined self-restraint 
consists of an intuitively based knowledge of the universal via the particu-
lar, utilized to overcome the self in favor of empowerment per se, achieved 
by turning oppression’s tensions against its own forces and institutions. The 
counterintuitive implication of these historical analyses is that (1) love can 
be an agonistic struggle, (2) humans can express transcendent generosity by 
imagining themselves gods, (3) even the worst evils can be reimagined as mere 
thoughtlessness, (4) universality shines fully through each particular being, 
(5) life and living beings naturally seek empowerment rather than a mere con-
tinuance of living, and (6) the most trivial and complicit movements of artistic 
expression involve tensions that can nevertheless be repurposed for liberation.
 Conclusion: A Contemporary, Feminist Application
One frequently hears various forms of feminism criticized on the grounds that 
they allegedly constitute a kind of “disturber of the peace”—the sword, if you 
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will, in the hands of women in our communities. Put differently, many folks 
on the conservative side of the culture wars claim that men and women are 
 naturally unequal (qua different), and thus that feminists’ efforts at gendered 
justice are fundamentally misguided, and ultimately create unnecessary con-
flicts and tensions within heterosexual relationships, traditional families, etc. 
What one does not tend to hear, however, are the thoughts of those who oc-
cupy a space between the two warring camps, temporarily undecided, and 
avoiding the question or issue altogether while nevertheless pursuing goals 
that align with many feminists’ goals. The latter include, notably, some race 
theorists, Marxian theorists, continental philosophers, and others who are in-
dependently invested in their work in the exploration of power differentials, 
but who do not necessarily identify as feminist.
Following Alison Jaggar, I will group the latter individuals under her umbrel-
la term, “non-feminists,” to differentiate those individuals from the outright 
opponents of various forms of feminism (whom Jaggar calls “anti-feminists”). 
Furthermore, I would argue that my conception of socially-just peace (to re-
peat, lovingly generous reimagining through intuitive self-overcoming tension) 
could be helpful in advancing Jaggar’s strategy. To wit, my conception seems to 
suggest that, in public discourses regarding feminism and women’s rights, it 
might be strategically beneficial to lovingly generously reimagine the linguistic 
productions of non-feminists, through intuitively self-overcoming tension, in 
order to resist cultural violence and promote sustainable tranquility.
Beginning with the above conceptual insights, peace as sustainable tran-
quility requires a move beyond a kind of civil war between roughly equal num-
bers of feminists and anti-feminists, which might be accomplished by  offering 
non-feminists a more comfortable pathway to the feminist camp. And the 
organismic empowerment here involves empowering non-feminists to both 
express their current, controversial views openly, and also benefit from the in-
formation and education that we, as feminists, can provide them in the course 
of such conversations.
From the above etymological insights, if peace is an artificial construc-
tion, then we cannot simply wait for nature to take its course and establish 
peace between feminists and anti-feminists. Instead, we must use our creativ-
ity and imagination to see non-feminists differently, so they can learn to see 
themselves in a different way that is more consonant with our struggles for 
gendered justice. And if social justice is the self-restraint of our capacities for 
force, then we must resist the urge to merely condemn or “shout down” anyone 
who is not already an avowed feminist, and instead give those who occupy 
more complex—and potentially coalition-friendly—positions to participate 
in a substantive conversation, with less fear on the non-feminists’ part of being 
silenced and demonized.
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Finally, from the above historical insights, peace appears to require a striving, 
combative love for non-feminists, in order to fuel a seemingly divine  degree of 
generosity (in the form of patience and the benefit of the doubt), and all in the 
service of reimagining non-feminists as potential allies rather than enemies. 
Social justice, complementarily, appears to require seeing  feminists’ spirit of 
gendered justice hidden within non-feminists. This could help us bracket our 
defensive self-labeling, and facilitate intensified life within our  potential allies 
(and between us and them). And this, in turn, could channel the tensions of 
our potential allies’ distrust, confusion, and skepticism into a more dynamic 
readiness to help fight for gendered justice.
In closing, I ask that the reader please join me in lovingly (with King), and 
generously (Aurelius), reimagining (Arendt), by channeling our intuitively 
(Spinoza) self-overcoming (Nietzsche) tension (Fanon), our non-feminist 
 others. In so doing, we can cocreate the artwork that is socially just peace.
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